Spring 2026 brings to the technology markets a picture full of stark contrasts. On the one hand, the world’s digital economy is reveling in the possibilities of generative artificial intelligence, which has become the foundation of the operational strategies of major companies. On the other hand, this foundation – based on the physical infrastructure of semiconductors – is showing cracks due to tensions whose nature goes far beyond pure business. Recent analyses suggest that we are on the threshold of a profound redefinition of the global ICT sector – the relationship between the superpowers has become its main regulator, creating a phenomenon that can be described as the Silicon Iron Curtain.
The current market situation is seemingly paradoxical. According to available data, global semiconductor sales are showing impressive dynamism, with growth of 18.8% this year, continuing last year’s trend when the rate was almost 23%. The driving force behind this phenomenon remains the unrelenting demand for the most advanced chips dedicated to data centres and artificial intelligence models. However, behind these optimistic figures lies an architecture of uncertainty. Production in the electronics and ICT sector, while maintaining its high growth rate of 10.3% this year, is forecast to cool noticeably in 2027, falling to 6.5%. This deceleration is not due to market saturation, but to increasing structural and political barriers that are beginning to hamper the free flow of innovation.
The biggest shadow cast over the future of the sector is the deepening polarisation between the US and China. Tightening rhetoric and trade policy tools are turning global supply chains into a battleground for technological dominance. A scenario in which tariffs are imposed on electronic products with no exceptions is a viable planning option for technology company managements. Such a situation forces organisations to move away from the previous paradigm of maximum cost optimisation to building geopolitical resilience. Access to the latest processors can be restricted by a single administrative decision, so stability becomes a more valuable currency than ad hoc margins.
In this complex balance of power, Europe appears to be in a particularly challenging position. The data here are inexorable – while the global average for the sector’s growth hovers around 10%, the forecast for the Old Continent for 2026 is a modest 1.3%. This disparity is the result of the specific structure of the European electronics industry. The region has traditionally specialised in the production of components for the automotive and industrial sectors. While this is a strategy consistent with Europe’s historical economic profile, it is proving insufficient. Lacking a strong manufacturing base for high-end chips, the European economy is losing ground in the most profitable and strategic high-tech areas.
Initiatives by EU authorities, such as the EU Chips Act, attempt to reverse this negative trend. The plan to invest €43 billion in local production and research aims not only to reduce dependence on Asian suppliers, but also to gain a 20% share of global production by 2030. However, sound analysis suggests that achieving this goal will be an extremely difficult task. Building an advanced semiconductor factory is a multi-year process, requiring not only a huge amount of capital, but above all unique know-how and access to rare raw materials and lithographic technologies that are currently concentrated outside Europe.
An interesting, and somewhat unexpected, factor in the revival of the European ICT sector is becoming a shift in defence policy priorities. The increase in military spending, particularly evident in Germany, is creating a new space for technological investment. The modernisation of the army in the 21st century is largely about the digitalisation of the battlefield, forcing the development of local expertise in advanced electronics and secure communications systems. For business, this means the emergence of a new, stable source of demand that can stimulate innovations that can later be adapted in the civilian sector. However, for these economies of scale to occur, there needs to be close cooperation between the public and private sectors and flexibility to adapt military technologies for commercial use.
From a strategic business management perspective, the coming years will require a redefinition of the concept of technological security. Reliance on a single source of supply, especially from regions of high political risk, is becoming an anachronism. Businesses face the need to diversify not only geographically, but also technologically. It is worth noting the growing importance of alternative architectures and the search for suppliers in third countries that can act as buffers in the conflict of giants. It is also becoming crucial to audit one’s own infrastructure for vulnerability to a sudden cut-off of technical support or hardware updates coming from overseas or the Far East.
