The smart home was supposed to be a promise of convenience, but it has quietly become a private version of IT infrastructure. This is particularly evident during the summer holidays: the owner is away, but the cameras, router, smart locks, sensors, apps, cloud accounts and automation systems remain online to ensure security.
This is no longer a topic exclusively for gadget enthusiasts. The smart home increasingly operates on the same network as work laptops, phones with access to corporate email, client documents and SaaS systems. The boundary between home and office has therefore blurred, not only organisationally but also technically. The home network has become part of the working environment, although it is rarely treated with the same level of seriousness as the company’s Wi-Fi.
The scale of the problem grows with the number of devices. In the average home connected to the network, there are now not only a computer and a smartphone, but also a television, a camera, a printer, a speaker, a vacuum cleaner, a thermostat, a video doorbell, smart lighting and a router that ties it all together. Research into the security of IoT devices indicates that the problem lies not only in individual vulnerabilities, but in the very architecture of this environment: many devices have limited security mechanisms, a long lifecycle, weak authentication and a reliance on the manufacturer’s app and the cloud.
Cameras are the most visible symbol of this risk. This is understandable, as they combine cybersecurity with privacy in the most direct way. Compromising an account or a device can mean gaining access to live footage from a home, recordings, the presence history of household members, or information about daily routines. The Ring case showed that the problem with cameras is not limited to hypothetical scenarios: the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) accused the company of inadequate security measures, which allowed user accounts and cameras to be compromised, as well as unauthorised access by employees and contractors to customers’ recordings.
But the camera is not the only – or even always the most significant – point of risk. In a smart home, the weakest link could be a hub, a television, a light bulb, a speaker or a device the user has long since forgotten about. From an attacker’s perspective, such a device need not be a target in its own right. It can serve as a gateway to the network, from which an attacker can monitor traffic, search for further vulnerabilities or attempt to gain access to more valuable resources. This is a well-known mechanism in corporate cybersecurity, simply transposed to the home.
That is why the router is more important than most gadgets. A camera is visible, but it is the router that serves as the command centre for the home’s infrastructure. If it’s running on outdated software, has a weak administrator password, active WPS, uncontrolled remote access, or unnecessary features that open services to the outside world, the security of the entire smart home becomes vulnerable. The minimum security requirements are up-to-date firmware, a strong password, WPA2 or WPA3, disabled features that household members do not use, and separating IoT devices from laptops and phones – even if only via a separate guest network.
The other half of the smart home lies outside the home. Many devices operate via manufacturers’ accounts, mobile apps and the cloud. This is where notifications, recordings, configurations, logs, integrations and permissions end up. A user may have a camera set up correctly, but if the app account lacks MFA, and former household members, an old phone or an unused integration still have access, the risk remains very real. In practice, smart home security only extends as far as the user’s account, the app and the provider’s infrastructure.
Holidays exacerbate these dependencies. Before leaving, users are more likely to activate lighting schedules, remote camera viewing, motion sensors, alarms and notifications. Sometimes they grant access to a neighbour, family member or someone looking after the property. The home is expected to operate more autonomously than usual, and the owner is more likely to log into the app via a mobile network, hotel Wi-Fi or public internet. The more self-sufficient the home is supposed to be whilst the owner is away, the more important it becomes to review accounts, passwords, updates and permissions in advance.
A holiday smart home check-up doesn’t have to be an audit for specialists. All you need to do is check which devices are connected to the network, update your router, cameras, hubs, smart TVs and manufacturers’ apps, enable MFA on your smart home accounts, change default passwords, remove old sharing permissions and disable features that nobody actually uses. It’s also worth ensuring that IoT devices aren’t operating on the same part of the network as work equipment, and that the camera doesn’t cover neighbours’ property, the stairwell, the pavement or other places where bystanders might be recorded.
The latter is just as important as the technical configuration. A smart home collects data not only about the owner, but often also about guests, couriers, neighbours and passers-by. With the development of cameras, facial recognition and automatic image analysis, private surveillance is increasingly extending beyond private spaces. This shifts the focus from convenience to data accountability.
The problem with smart homes is not that every device is inherently dangerous. The problem is that many of them operate for years without being checked, on a single flat network, with accounts lacking additional authentication, and with settings that nobody has remembered since the initial setup. A holiday-time smart home check is therefore less of a technological fad and more a matter of basic digital hygiene. This is particularly true when the same infrastructure is intended to protect your home, your privacy and your remote working conditions.
